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The  ever-increasing  complexity  of  the  food  supply  has  magniﬁed  the  importance  of  ongoing
research  into  nutrition  and  food  safety  issues  that  have  signiﬁcant  impact  on  public  health.
At the  same  time,  ethical  questions  have been  raised  regarding  conﬂict  of interest,  making
it more  challenging  to form  the  expert  panels  that  advise  government  agencies  and  public
health ofﬁcials  in  formulating  nutrition  and  food  safety  policy.  Primarily  due  to  the  growing
complexity  of  the  interactions  among  government,  industry,  and  academic  research  insti-
tutions,  increasingly  stringent  conﬂict-of-interest  policies  may  have  the  effect  of barring
the most  experienced  and  knowledgeable  nutrition  and  food  scientists  from  contributing
their  expertise  on  the  panels  informing  public  policy.  This  paper  explores  the  issue  in some
depth, proposing  a set of  principles  for  determining  considerations  for service  on  expertcientiﬁc biases advisory committees.  Although  the  issues  around  scientiﬁc  policy  counsel  and  the selection
of advisory  panels  clearly  have  global  applicability,  the  context  for  their development  had
a US  and  Canadian  focus  in  this  work.  The  authors  also  call for  a broader  discussion  in all
sectors  of  the research  community  as  to whether  and  how  the  process  of  empaneling  food
on  expscience  and  nutriti
. IntroductionFood and nutrition science are disciplines that are both
ighly evolved and intimately in touch with our lives. Its
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professionals conduct research and advance the knowledge
base on topics, including food microbiology, nutrigen-
omics, food chemistry, food processing, food packaging,
nutrition, toxicology, biochemistry, risk analysis, consumer
science, and science communication. In recent decades, as
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.the science itself has advanced, the range of foods has esca-
lated and imports have increased dramatically, all resulting
in emerging regulatory and risk environments that are
increasingly complex. Through food and nutrition research
 Policy 
has coincided with new demands from consumers and
taxpayers for environmental and food safety advances
based on public research.S. Rowe et al. / Health
our knowledge and understanding increases, whether it
is discovering how omega-3 fatty acids affect health, how
complex carbohydrates affect metabolism, or how certain
micronutrients inﬂuence performance. Similarly, the work
of nutrition and food scientists establishes the standard
requirements for consuming micro- and macro-nutrients
issued regularly by the US Institute of Medicine (IOM) [1]
or intermittently by the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA)
[2]. To develop such guidance, the IOM and FSA empanel
scientiﬁc experts in each relevant ﬁeld and request their
advice based on the best current science.
If further conﬁrmation of the importance of food sci-
ence research for public health is needed, there is no need
to look further than the most recent instances of food
contamination. The work of food scientists identiﬁes the
pathogens involved and also provides scientiﬁc insights
to advise policy makers on effective management of food-
borne illness outbreaks and on toxicological issues around
food packaging and chemicals. Food research also counsels
both industry and government on safe practices in produc-
ing, processing, and packaging the nation’s food supply. The
process for empaneling those scientiﬁc experts as advisers
forms the subject matter of this paper.
2. Purpose of this work
The US Congress passed the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act (FACA) in 1972 to bring transparency and
consistency to government policy making. In part, FACA
states that “standards and uniform procedures should
govern the establishment, operation, administration, and
duration of advisory committees” [3]. To ensure the
integrity of policy based on advice from advisory com-
mittees, FACA requires “the membership of the advisory
committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the points of
view represented and the functions to be performed by the
advisory committee” [3].
International organizations such as the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (FAO), the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA), and other global health, science, and food
entities have established systems by which policy makers
can become informed of the current science before issu-
ing recommendations. This work aims to distil common
inclusionary and exclusionary rules from existing expert
advisory criteria of US domestic and international scien-
tiﬁc organizations and to propose a set of best practices
that will enhance expertise available to policy makers.
3. Methodology
It is generally well known that advisory panels of all
kinds have proliferated in the past several decades, and
policy makers on a range of issues have had the beneﬁt of
varied expertise. What is less well known is exactly how the
various expert panels are chosen, especially the criteria by
which experts are selected or excluded from consideration.
In researching this paper, the authors reviewed existing
organizations that employ the use of expert committees
to offer counsel in decision making.112 (2013) 172– 178 173
Internet searches were conducted to discover the mech-
anisms in use by US and international organizations, from
government to foundations and non-proﬁts, engaged in
science-based policy making. Supplemental Table 1 con-
tains an array of the criteria and selection processes (or lack
thereof) for scientiﬁc panels with a focus on nutrition, food
science, and food safety. Special attention was paid to the
existence of inclusionary criteria as well as exclusionary
criteria in forming advisory panels. In addition, the authors
assessed the transparency of advisory committee creation
as well as provisions for addressing privacy concerns of
panel members.
4. The challenges of the conﬂict-of-interest gap
There are myriad advisory committees operating both
in the United States and internationally such as in Europe,
Asia, South America, and Africa. In past decades, these com-
mittees have generally reﬂected diverse and broad-ranging
expertise. Unfortunately, the range of informed and varied
scientiﬁc perspectives and experience on advisory commit-
tees is under pressure not to increase in the future, but to
decrease for one predominant reason: concern over con-
ﬂicts of interest. The issue was prominently raised in major
medical journals a decade ago [4,5], and in recent years has
stimulated substantial media coverage,1 journal commen-
taries, and a lengthy series of changes in the way  potential
ﬁnancial conﬂicts have been dealt with by research funding
organizations (e.g., tighter limits on the funding amounts
of potential conﬂicts, and more detailed reporting require-
ments).
At the same time, there has been a shift in the
way nutrition and food safety research is funded, away
from public sources and toward private-sector funding.
In addition, the proportion of public funding available
for food-related research has been signiﬁcantly reduced
[6]. Robust growth in private-sector ﬁnancial support for
this research has helped to make private-sector scientists
increasingly important in adding to the world’s store of
scientiﬁc knowledge on food and health issues. The kind
of research being undertaken has also shifted in recent
decades away from basic research to applied research.
In one speciﬁc ﬁeld of interest, a recent study by the
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research
Service [7] argued that:
Public agricultural research has been a major contribu-
tor to advances in agricultural productivity that have
led to abundant and affordable food and ﬁber in the
United States. . . . Private investment in agricultural
R&D surpassed public investment for the ﬁrst time in
1980. The slowdown in public research funding growth1 A general Google search conducted on August 16, 2011, using the
term “scientiﬁc research conﬂicts of interest,” yielded approximately
18,800,000 results.
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Although both public and private-sector research now
ontribute to improvements in food and nutrition, there
as been an increased public dependence and emphasis on
rivate-sector funding of research and public/private sci-
ntiﬁc collaborations at the same time as there has been
rowing pressure to restrict participation on expert pan-
ls of scientists conducting research with industry because
f conﬂict-of-interest perceptions. It can be argued that
n expert who has been selected deliberately because of
 lack of relevant food industry experience will necessarily
ack a contextual understanding of a given food issue. Of
ourse, the same would be true for any industry: Experts
eliberately selected for their lack of speciﬁc industry expe-
ience would necessarily lack contextual understanding of
ndustry-related issues.
The conﬂict-of-interest issue has escalated, prompting
ews, commentaries, and announcements. For example,
n mid-2009, a working group of the North American
ranch of the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI
orth America) released a white paper proposing eight
uiding principles to manage ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest
n conducting public/private research relationships [8]. The
ocument, which was intended to stimulate a broader and
eeper discussion of the issue in the scientiﬁc community,
as published simultaneously in six scientiﬁc journals,
ncluding the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, Food
cience, Journal of the American Dietetic Association,
ournal of Nutrition, Nutrition Reviews, and Nutrition
oday. Interestingly, the conﬂict-of-interest discussion has
ocused almost exclusively on ﬁnancial conﬂicts, to the
eneral exclusion of other types of bias that can inﬂuence
esearch, as illustrated by Rowe et al. [8].
. . .[F]or researchers, a conﬂict might describe a situa-
tion in which a funder has offered ﬁnancial incentives
for research and hopes for a particular research result; it
might also describe a situation in which the researcher,
for philosophical, religious, or professional reasons,
wishes to achieve a certain result. Neither situation nec-
essarily results in a biased result—that would depend
on a measurable deviation of research results from ‘the
truth’—although much of the literature regrettably con-
founds bias and conﬂict. For that matter, much of the
literature confuses conﬂict with a particular kind of
conﬂict—ﬁnancial. Unfortunately, even if all conﬂicts
were banished forever, there would still be myriad
sources of bias.
Notwithstanding the multitude of possible research
iases, there is broad consensus that potential ﬁnancial
onﬂicts need to be disclosed and managed if the scientiﬁc
ommunity and policy makers are to retain the public trust
9]. There has been a persistent call to require ever-greater
isclosure and to intensify the management of ﬁnancial
onﬂicts [10], with a resultant tightening of conﬂict-of-
nterest rules across both academic research institutions
nd the government agencies that typically fund research
11].
There is now real concern within the scientiﬁc com-
unity that the exclusion of scientists deemed to have
nancial conﬂicts may  lead to a diminution of industry-
cademia interactions—interactions that FACA intended to112 (2013) 172– 178
encourage to broaden and enhance expertise on scientiﬁc
advisory panels. This concern has animated a thoughtful
discussion in academic circles. In the revision of its conﬂict
of interest policies, the committee drafting new guidelines
for the Harvard Medical School in 2010 noted that “. . .
the COI policy has always aimed to reinforce an essen-
tial principle: interactions between academia and industry
are crucial to science and to facilitating the translation of
knowledge from the research bench to the hospital bed-
side” [12]. That Harvard committee went even further in
enumerating speciﬁcally which types of interactions it con-
sidered crucial [12], stating the following:
(W)e encourage faculty to engage in a wide variety
of activities with industry, including, but not limited
to: conducting research sponsored and supported by
industry; collaborating with industry on research pro-
tocols and co-authoring publications derived from these
collaborations; consulting for industry; serving on the
scientiﬁc advisory boards of pharmaceutical, device,
and biotechnology companies.
5. The current playing ﬁeld
How do existing organizations structure their advisory
panels? A wide-ranging overview of scientiﬁc organiza-
tions internationally was undertaken by the authors to
determine how such issues as conﬂict of interest and trans-
parency are currently handled in nongovernment settings
(Supplemental Tables 1 and 2). Thirteen nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and scientiﬁc professional societies
were examined, including the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, American Cancer Society, Amer-
ican Dietetic Association, American Heart Association,
American Society for Nutrition, EFSA, FAO, Institute of Food
Technologists, Kellogg Foundation, National Academies,
National Science Foundation, Robert Wood Johnson Foun-
dation, and WHO. Of these 13 organizations and societies,
four had discoverable selection criteria for advisory or
expert panels, ﬁve made transparency an explicit part of
their selection guidelines, seven made disclosure forms
available, and three made readily discoverable mention of
privacy concerns or safeguards for experts serving on com-
mittees and required to disclose potential conﬂicts.
Interestingly, of the organizations researched as to how
advisory panels are established, speciﬁc criteria for selec-
tion of experts are often not transparently available and,
in some cases, are difﬁcult to virtually impossible to locate
at all. Those organizations that make their selection pro-
cess transparent to any degree typically employ general,
inclusionary language similar to that found on the WHO
website [13], specifying that experts should be selected
“. . .taking into consideration the need for adequate rep-
resentation of different trends of thought, approaches and
practical experience in various parts of the world, as well
as for an appropriate interdisciplinary balance. . .”.
The WHO  inclusionary language is similar to that foundon panels, while bringing together individuals with varying
backgrounds, experience, and expertise. More commonly
found when searching for expert selection criteria are
 Policy S. Rowe et al. / Health
stipulations about possible conﬂicts, as discussed by the
WHO [14]: “. . .Numerous safeguards are in place to man-
age conﬂicts of interest or perceived conﬂicts of interest
among members of WHO  advisory groups and expert com-
mittees. Expert advisers provide a signed declaration of
interests to WHO  detailing any professional or ﬁnancial
interest that could affect the impartiality of their advice.”
Similarly, the inclusionary language from the National
Academies tends to be general and nonspeciﬁc, as provided
below [15]:
Selection of appropriate committee members, individ-
ually and collectively, is essential for the success of
a study. All committee members serve as individual
experts, not as representatives of organizations or inter-
est groups. Each member is expected to contribute to the
project on the basis of his or her own expertise and good
judgment . . . The committee must include experts with
the speciﬁc expertise and experience needed to address
the study’s statement of task . . . It is also essential to
evaluate the overall composition of the committee in
terms of different experiences and perspectives. The
goal is to ensure that the relevant points of view are,
in the National Academies’ judgment, reasonably bal-
anced so that the committee can carry out its charge
objectively and credibly.”
The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) inclusionary
selection criteria for study section service is worded as fol-
lows [16]: “Candidates must be recognized authorities in
their ﬁeld; candidates must be a principal investigator on
a research project comparable to those being reviewed . . .
Candidates must be dedicated to high quality, fair reviews...
Expertise is the paramount consideration when develop-
ing/updating a study section roster.”
Yet when it comes to guidelines for excluding scientiﬁc
expertise, organizations tend to be extremely speciﬁc. The
NIH’s current proposal for strengthening existing conﬂict-
of-interest rules in which government research grants are
concerned runs in excess of 27,000 words [17]. In general,
exclusionary criteria are signiﬁcantly more prevalent than
inclusionary criteria in determining qualiﬁcations to serve
on an expert advisory committee, as illustrated by the fol-
lowing example [17]: “. . . The experts who volunteer their
time participating on study committees are vetted to make
sure that the committee has the range of expertise needed
to address the task, that they have a balance of perspec-
tives, and to identify and eliminate members with conﬂicts
of interest.”
Another example is the most recent, revised guid-
ance from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on
considering conﬂict of interest [18], which is excerpted as
follows:
Advisory committee members will be considered under
a more stringent policy regarding the level of ﬁnan-
cial interests in organizations that potentially could
be affected by the meeting deliberations. First, if an
individual has disqualifying ﬁnancial interests whose
combined value exceeds $50,000, she generally would
not participate in the meeting, regardless of the
need for her expertise. Second, if the disqualifying112 (2013) 172– 178 175
ﬁnancial interests are $50,000 or less, the individual
would be eligible to participate only if she met  the
applicable statutory standard for participation; e.g., the
need for her services outweighs the potential con-
ﬂict. Third, even where the standard for participation
is met, the individual’s participation would be limited
to non-voting. Fourth, FDA intends to generally limit
participation in certain cases where there may  be a
perception of a conﬂict of interest, even though full
participation would be permitted under the applicable
statutes.
As can be seen from this FDA document, management of
ﬁnancial conﬂicts has become considerably more zealous
in recent years. Most notably, absolute dollar limits have
increasingly taken the place of regulatory discretion and
the mere perception of conﬂict has now become a metric
for eligibility (and a disqualifying metric, in some cases).
In general, examination of various science-based orga-
nizations’ processes for establishing expert committees
yields little consistency as to criteria for advisory service,
limited transparency as to the process by which panels
are selected, and a signiﬁcant focus on exclusionary crite-
ria. Furthermore, disqualifying factors are almost always
ﬁnancial—conﬂicts and biases of other types seem to be,
for the most part, ignored by science-based organizations
or, at most, dealt with cursorily in the general qualiﬁca-
tion outlines. An exception internationally is the WHO/FAO
guidelines [19], which require potential scientiﬁc experts
to “list in writing any interest (ﬁnancial and intellectual)
on their part . . . that may  affect their scientiﬁc indepen-
dence as experts (emphasis added).” As the new Harvard
Medical School policy states [12]: “The challenge for all
organizations is to achieve process transparency and to
craft conﬂict-of-interest guidelines, ﬁnancial and other-
wise, that are sufﬁciently comprehensive to embrace the
best and broadest scientiﬁc knowledge and expertise avail-
able, without being so restrictive that they exclude critical
knowledge” and best-informed viewpoints from expert
panels (emphasis added).
6. Guiding principles for advisory eligibility
Without further belaboring the point, it could be asked:
Might there be a set of underlying principles or guide-
lines for ensuring inclusiveness, balance, and transparency
in establishing panels of scientiﬁc advisers—principles or
guidelines that could be adapted and used by a variety of
organizations, proﬁt and nonproﬁt, governmental and non-
governmental? In the 2009 article on conﬂict of interest by
Rowe et al. [8], a set of eight guidelines were proposed as a
point of departure for researchers and research organiza-
tions wishing to manage potential conﬂicts of interest.
The authors of this work propose a similar set of guiding
criteria for establishing scientiﬁc advisory panels, which is
described as follows.• There should be eligibility criteria, both inclusionary and
exclusionary, in considering all candidates with issue-
relevant knowledge and experience.
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Full disclosure of all relevant ﬁnancial interests should
be required, and only those applicants who would be
directly affected by the work of the panel ﬁnancially
should be considered ineligible.
Consideration of potential biases—including, but not
limited to, political, ideological, religious, philosophical,
ﬁnancial, and so forth—should not be a factor in eligibil-
ity for the pool of experts to be drawn upon as advisers,
except as speciﬁed in the previous criterion.
To satisfy existing inclusionary criteria from organiza-
tions such as WHO, EFSA, and others, subject-speciﬁc
scientists from all geographic and ethnic backgrounds,
both male and female, should be encouraged to apply,
and the pool of such candidates should be large and broad
enough to ensure that no relevant expertise is excluded
from consideration.
Eligibility should be extended to candidates from all sec-
tors including, but not limited to, academia, professional
societies, government agencies, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, and private-sector institutions.
To ensure transparency and public trust in the selection
process, eligibility and selection criteria should be made
clear and available for anyone wishing to see them.
The above list could likely be expanded and fur-
her detailed, but the point is that all inclusionary
riteria for establishing expert panels should be just
hat—inclusionary. Obviously, for any given policy making
bjective (e.g., in weighing approval of new food safety or
utrient assessment technologies), there would be practi-
al reasons to reﬁne the panel selection criteria through
xclusionary considerations. The current concerns with
nancial conﬂicts of interest have already been discussed;
owever, there are clearly many other exclusionary con-
iderations such as insufﬁcient length and/or quality of
peciﬁc experience, time constraints in serving as advisers,
nd myriad of potential biases (detailed below).
The twin issues of ﬁnancial conﬂicts of interest and
ias are a matter of balance. It is not a matter of draft-
ng exclusionary rules alone, but of creating a mechanism
or managing and mitigating biases, for forging panels of
cientists with a reputation for fair-mindedness, and for
alancing the inevitable biases of panelists. As the Biparti-
an Policy Center (BPC) concluded in its report to current
overnment administrators [20]:
Bias is an inherently murky concept, and every indi-
vidual has biases. But the goal should generally be to
assemble committees of individuals who are as impar-
tial (i.e., fair-minded) as possible. This is not the same
as saying that a committee should (or could) be made
up of individuals with no views on the matter at hand;
the goal is to pull together a committee that can act
in good faith. The approach to bias will depend on
the precise question(s) being posed to the committee.
Generally, strong biases in committee members should
be avoided. But in some cases, an agency may  want
to appoint some members with strong and even ﬁxed
views on an issue because they need such individuals’
expertise or because they want to ensure that those sci-
entiﬁc views are fully represented on the committee.112 (2013) 172– 178
In such instances, the goal should be to ensure that the
overall committee is balanced.
To examine a few of those possible biases more closely,
one approach to managing them might be as follows. A spe-
ciﬁc list of most likely issues could be drawn up, applicants
under consideration could be queried, and a review com-
mittee could assess strengths and weaknesses and make
recommendations. Rowe et al. offered an extensive list
of relevant potential biases [8], including (to name just a
few) ﬁnancial or funding bias, one’s previous body of work,
desire for fame and respect among peers, and religious
or philosophical bias; the key consideration in managing
these and other biases is ensuring that the maximum rel-
evant scientiﬁc expertise be brought to bear on matters
being explored by advisory panels.
The suggested approach to managing bias is only
one potential tool. Another approach might be to focus
the bias discussion on the need for balance among
professional biases and to disregard the more vague emo-
tional/philosophical biases. Yet another suggestion for
streamlining the process for managing nonﬁnancial bias is
that all potential members of an advisory committee reveal
all public statements that they have made that bear on the
subject of the advisory committee. Organizations or agen-
cies involved in speciﬁc ﬁelds of interest or inquiry may
well want to make more speciﬁc some of the potential
applicant biases, bearing in mind that some might war-
rant exclusion from advisory panels. As pointed out in
the National Academies’ bias/ﬁnancial conﬂicts guidance
[21]: “Some potential sources of bias, however, may be
so substantial that they preclude committee service (e.g.,
where one is totally committed to a particular point of
view and unwilling, or reasonably perceived to be unwill-
ing, to consider other perspectives or relevant evidence to
the contrary).”
In any case, guidelines for forming expert advisory
groups can easily be modiﬁed and adapted to particular
issues and purposes—the idea is to have and follow guide-
lines, instead of proceeding in an ad hoc manner and to
ensure the broadest most comprehensive pool of expertise
is recruited as well as to ensure that subsequent winnow-
ing exclusionary steps (such as the National Academy of
Sciences’ interview process), do not eliminate necessary
expertise from ultimate panels. An organization’s credibil-
ity and trustworthiness would certainly be enhanced if it
advertised that it embraced established criteria in selecting
expert advisers.
7. A word on transparency
Just as the list of inclusionary (eligibility) criteria should
be as transparent as possible, exclusionary criteria should
be explicit and available for open review. Clarity and trans-
parency are the hallmarks of honesty and trust that should
accompany and support any future efforts at codifying
selection criteria for advisory panels.Two types of transparency have been discussed in this
work: the transparency of any selection guidelines them-
selves, both inclusionary and exclusionary, as well as the
transparency that is encouraged or required of experts
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being considered for advisory service. The ﬁrst type of
transparency is a prerequisite to maintain public trust:
the rules and procedures by which panelists are chosen
along with a general public disclosure of potential ﬁnan-
cial conﬂicts. The second kind of transparency entails the
unnecessary publication of private or family data or other
personal life details that are not likely to affect scientiﬁc
objectivity, but the disclosure of which may  well deter the
willingness of the expert to participate in the advisory pro-
cess at all. The second type of transparency could actually
diminish the trustworthiness and credibility of a panel of
experts, in that it could actually, in effect, be a nontrans-
parent exclusionary mechanism. It is an issue of discretion
and conﬁdentiality: The need for transparency must be bal-
anced by the need to protect the privacy of applicants for
expert advisory status.
Unfortunately, privacy concerns are rarely mentioned in
organizational discussions of expert qualiﬁcations. In one
WHO/FAO document on the provision of scientiﬁc advice
to Codex and member countries [22], privacy concerns
regarding experts surface explicitly in only one sentence:
The selection process should be transparent, includ-
ing dealing adequately with conﬂicts of interest. The
determination of whether a conﬂict of interest exists
should rest with FAO/WHO. Information on organiza-
tional afﬁliation, government service, research support,
public statements and positions, ﬁnancial interest and
other interests (e.g. professional afﬁliations) should be
provided. This information, as appropriate, should be
available publicly before the meeting (e.g. via Internet),
consistent with rules of privacy.
Again, the “rules of privacy” are not well established
and many questions require consideration. How much
disclosure, even of ﬁnancial interests, might constitute a
breach of the rules of privacy? To whom are potential panel
experts to disclose details of their activities, ﬁnancial or
otherwise—to the organization appointing the panel or also
to the public at large? Exactly how much discretion is to be
shown in handling private information? When disclosures
are posted in cyberspace, one may  suppose that they have
been made accessible to everyone in the world. In estab-
lishing criteria for selecting scientiﬁc experts to serve on
advisory panels, organizations should ensure that an overly
rigorous transparency does not wind up excluding the best
scientiﬁc knowledge and the broadest scientiﬁc perspec-
tive, an outcome that would certainly adversely impact
appropriate communication to the public. With the con-
stant expansion of the web and increasing dependence on
the web for transparency, major challenges are posed for
ensuring discretion in deciding what to post on a website
and how appropriately to protect privacy.
The BPC report cited above has taken explicit notice
of a related need for privacy in panel deliberations. In its
2010 report to Congress, the BPC provided the following
recommendation [20]:The Administration and the Congress should care-
fully think through the beneﬁts and disadvantages of
requiring all meetings to be open. It might be worth
considering, for example, whether some scientiﬁc112 (2013) 172– 178 177
advisory committees could be allowed to hold some
closed meetings if the selection process for committee
membership were more open than it generally is today.
It is another aspect of privacy that there be provisions of
conﬁdentiality that apply when scientiﬁc experts are asked
to make private disclosures. As such, perhaps there should
be clearly delineated rules of transparency.
8. Conclusion: moving toward a consensus
framework
One could conclude from the preceding discussion that
there is a real need for explicit and transparent selection
criteria—including rules for disclosure and boundaries of
transparency—in creating the broadest and most knowl-
edgeable universe of scientiﬁc experts from which to
assemble advisory groups. Public trust in science and sci-
entists has been high in the past decades (in spite of
ever-present concerns about potential declines in trust)
[23]. The same cannot be said for public trust in govern-
ment, according to a 2010 report from the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press [24], although gov-
ernment agencies enjoy higher public conﬁdence than the
political arms of government. Bearing in mind that federal
agencies may, by law, not have the discretion regarding
transparency that other organizations have, greater public
visibility of both the rules and the procedures would seem
essential to building trust.
How do we  move to a consensus on managing con-
ﬂicts of interest, transparency, and building trust in the
scientiﬁc advisory process? With the caveat that these sug-
gestions are intended to invite a further robust discussion,
there might be general agreement that: (1) securing the
trust of the scientiﬁc community and the public at large
is paramount; (2) all stakeholders in science-based policy
making should be part of this effort: government agen-
cies, individual scientists (whether working in industry or
academia), young investigators, publication and editorial
boards, university department heads, industry, NGOs, and
so forth; (3) selection of expert panels should be guided
by speciﬁc and explicit criteria; (4) criteria should be both
exclusionary and inclusionary; (5) criteria and the selec-
tion process must be transparent; and (6) privacy issues
should be respected and discretion exercised in making
public disclosures.
Finally, it must be recognized that the scientiﬁc
landscape is becoming extremely complex and frag-
mented. Transparency and perceived fairness are no
longer nice add-ons to the scientiﬁc method and sci-
entiﬁc communications—they are necessary components
of them. It is also time for the scientiﬁc panel selec-
tion process to be publically visible. One suggestion to
enhance transparency of the advisory panel process itself
is to single out for public information scientiﬁc ques-
tions which, during panel deliberations, proved to provoke
the greatest disagreement among the experts on the
panel—highlighting areas of greatest scientiﬁc uncertainty
might well aid the public in understanding the nature of
scientiﬁc debates. Might it also be helpful if instead of hav-
ing to reach one consensus on a scientiﬁc issue, panels
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As has been argued, it is of critical importance to
mbrace a range of expertise on advisory panels, including
hose who work with the food industry to achieve the depth
f knowledge and experience—in short, the best-informed
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